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Abstract
This paper develops a structured dynamic factor model for the
spreads between London Interbank O¤ered Rate (LIBOR) and overnight
index swap (OIS) rates for a panel of banks. Our model involves
latent factors which relect liquidity and credit risk. Our empirical
results show that surges in the short term LIBOR-OIS spreads dur-
ing the 2007-2009 nancial crisis were largely driven by liquidity risk.
However, credit risk played a more signicant role in the longer term
(twelve-month) LIBOR-OIS spread. The liquidity risk factors are
more volatile than the credit risk factor. Most of the familiar events
in the nancial crisis are linked more to movements in liquidity risk
than credit risk.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
Gary Koop is a Fellow of the Rimini Center for Economic Analysis.
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1 Introduction
One of the most obvious signs of the nancial crisis was a jump in the rates
on uncollateralized loans across banks in Europe and the US. A standard
measure of the rates on these uncollateralized loans is the daily submission
of borrowing rates by major banks to the British Bankers Association used
to form the standard set of London Interbank O¤er Rates (LIBOR). LIBOR
rates are referenced in a large number of nancial contracts in the global
economy. There are three main reasons why LIBOR rates can change: i)
central banks can change expectations of their policy rate, thereby repricing
most short-term loans between banks; ii) banks can require a higher com-
pensation for default risk on loans and iii) liquidity in the inter-bank loan
market can change in ways unrelated to the open market operations of cen-
tral banks. The last two of these reasons are called credit risk and liquidity
risk. In order to focus on the roles of credit and liquidity risks, it is common
to take out market expectations of future central bank policy rates by sub-
tracting the overnight index swap (OIS)1 rate from the LIBOR rate, leading
to the LIBOR-OIS spread. A number of studies emphasize that the LIBOR-
OIS spread contains credit risk and liquidity risk premia (e.g., McAndrews
et al, 2008, Michaud and Upper, 2008, Sengupta and Tam, 2008 and Hui et
al, 2010).2 Detailed chronicles of the sharp increases in LIBOR-OIS spread
along with the unfolding of nancial turmoil can be found in Sengupta and
Tam (2008), Brunnermeier (2009), Thornton (2009) and many other papers.
The LIBOR-OIS spread has attracted a lot of attention in the literature
on the nancial crisis. For instance, McAndrews et al (2008), Taylor and
Williams (2008a, 2008b) and Wu (2008) investigate whether the Federal Re-
serves Term Auction Facility (TAF) has helped to reduce the liquidity risk
component embodied in the LIBOR-OIS spread. However, the credit risk
and liquidity risk components are rarely explicitly disentangled in the liter-
ature. For example, researchers testing the TAF e¤ect on liquidity premium
1The OIS rate is a commonly-used measure of investor expectations of the e¤ective
federal funds rate and should not reect credit or liquidity risk (see, e.g., Sengupta and
Tam, 2008).
2According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000, 2001), credit risk
mostly reects the uncertainty that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to repay the
loan according to the agreed terms. However, credit risk also arises from various banking
activities other than loans, including in the banking book and in the trading book, and
both on and o¤ the balance sheet. Liquidity risk arises from bankspotential inability to
fund increases in assets and meet obligations when they come due.
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typically look into the impact of TAF on the LIBOR-OIS spread after in-
cluding an observed measure, such as the credit default swap (CDS) rate, to
control for the credit premium. As noted in McAndrews et al (2008), this
practice risks underestimating the TAF e¤ect if liquidity and credit risk pre-
miums is positively correlated. Furthermore, most of the literature has used
a single aggregate LIBOR-OIS time series, not exploiting the cross-bank,
cross-term and cross-currency variation in LIBOR rates. In the present pa-
per, we develop an econometric model which exploits these extra dimensions
of variation in LIBOR and CDS rates and explicitly includes separate latent
variables to model credit and liquidity risks. The main goal is to obtain a
better understanding of the evolution of credit and liquidity risks during the
nancial crisis and investigate the importance of Goodand Badstates
for these risks.
Our data includes LIBOR-OIS spreads in the USD (US Dollar), EUR
(Euro) and GBP (UK Pound Sterling) markets at di¤erent terms for a large
panel of banks. Note that the British Bankers Association (BBA) published
LIBOR rate (which is used in much of the literature), is calculated based
on the trimmed average of the submission rates of all banks listed in the
LIBOR panel. In contrast to this, we focus on individual banks quoted
rates.3 Submission rates of a bank on a certain LIBOR currency panel are
the lowest perceived rates for that bank to get unsecured interbank loans in
that currency. Our assumption is that an individual banks submitted LIBOR
rates reect the banks own exposure to the latent credit and liquidity risk
factors which operate in the market as a whole.
Our empirical results suggest that the widened short term (one-month
and three-month) LIBOR-OIS spreads in the nancial crisis were largely
due to sharp increases in liquidity risks, but the surges in the longer term
(twelve-month) spread were associated with both credit and liquidity risk.
Furthermore, the latent liquidity risk factors are found to be much more
variable than the credit risk factors and their variation is associated with
familiar events in the nancial crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Section 2 presents our
modelling framework which section 3 discusses the econometrics. Our Bayesian
econometric methods for estimating our models combine standard algorithms,
such as Gibbs sampling methods for the dynamic factor and Markov switch-
3Information on banksLIBOR rates submission and how published BBA LIBOR is
calculated can be found in the BBA LIBOR Ltds website http://www.bbalibor.com
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ing models. Accordingly, we do not provide all econometric details in this
paper. Instead a Technical Appendix, available on the website
http://personal.strath.ac.uk/gary.koop/, provides complete details of the
posterior simulation algorithm along with details of the prior. This appendix
also includes additional empirical results including a prior sensitivity analysis
(see Section 4.4 for details). Section 4 describes the empirical results and
section 5 concludes.
2 The Modelling Framework
Let Sijkt be the spread between an individual banks (j = 1; :::; J will denote
banks) quoted LIBOR rate at term i (for i = 1; :::; I) and the OIS rate of
the same term in currency k (for k = 1; :::; K) at date t (for t = 1; :::; T ).
This spread is assumed to depend on latent variables measuring liquidity and
credit risks which reect the state of the market as a whole. Liquidity risk
is allowed to vary across currencies (since liquidity risk in di¤erent curren-
cies will be inuenced by country-specic e¤ects and actions of local central
banks), but credit risk does not. Thus, let Lkt denote liquidity risk in cur-
rency k and Ct denote the counterparty credit risk amongst banks. Lkt and
Ct are unobserved factors that we are seeking to estimate. To try and disen-
tangle liquidity and credit risk, we model the LIBOR-OIS spread jointly with
a second dependent variable which is the CDS rate of an individual bank,
Djt. The main part of our model can be written as:
Sijkt = 
S
ijkLkt +  
S
ijCt + 
0
ikXt + "
S
ijkt (1)
Djt =  
C
j Ct + 
0
Zt + "
D
jt (2)
where "Sijkt  IIDN(0; 2ijkS), "Djt  IIDN(0; 2jD) and these errors are in-
dependent of each other. Note that (2) also allows for observed explanatory
variables, Xt and Zt, which can inuence Sijkt and Djt, respectively.
Note that this model embodies many assumptions which allow us to iden-
tify the liquidity and credit risks. Most importantly, the CDS rate of a bank
is assumed not to depend directly on the liquidity risk in the market as a
whole. Next, note the subscripts on the factor loadings. These vary across
terms, to capture the e¤ect that, in the nancial crisis, banks were especially
reluctant to lend to each other at longer maturities. They also vary across
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banks. However, the credit risk factor has an impact of the LIBOR-OIS
spread which is the same across currencies. Given our previous interpreta-
tion of the credit risk factor as it impacts upon global banks, we argue the
latter assumption is sensible.
Dynamic factor models such as ours require identication restrictions. In
this paper, we impose the following restrictions on factor loadings in order
to uniquely identify and interpret the factors:
Sijk > 0; 
S
11k = 1
 Cj > 0;  
C
1 = 1
 Sij > 0;  
S
11 = 1
Note that the inequality restrictions above ensure that increases in Lkt and
Ct increase the LIBOR-OIS spread and the CDS rate (i.e. high values of
these latent variables indicate a bad liquidity/credit risk situations). Setting
S11k =  
C
1 =  
S
11 = 1 is a standard was of ensuring identication in dynamic
factor models such as ours.4 We also require an identication restriction on
ik which is done by setting I1 = 0.
To complete the dynamic factor model, we have to specify equations
describing the evolution of Lkt and Ct. We assume they evolve over time
according to Markov-switching AR(1) processes. The AR choice allows for
us to model persistence in the states, but the Markov-switching allows for the
abrupt switches which may have occurred in the nancial crisis. Formally, we
allow the latent factors, Ct and Lkt, to depend on Markov-switching states,
sCt 2 fGC ; BCg and sLt 2 fGL; BLg, where our G and B notation indicates
goodand badstates for credit and liquidity risks:
Lkt = 
L
k0(s
L
t ) + 
L
k1(s
L
t )Lk;t 1 + kL(s
L
t )v
L
kt; (3)
Ct = 
C
0 (s
C
t ) + 
C
1 (s
C
t )Ct 1 + C(s
C
t )v
C
t ; (4)
where vLkt and v
C
t are independent standard Normal (i.e. independent over
time and of each other). To ensure stationarity of the dynamics of the linear
factors, we impose the restrictions:
0  C1 (sCt ) < 1
4Our identication scheme normalizes the factor loading for the term i = 1 to unity.
We experimented with normalizing on i = 2 or 3 and results were virtually unaltered.
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0  L1 (sLt ) < 1:
With regards to the Markov switching part of the model, note that there
are four possible combinations of the good and bad credit and liquidity states.
Thus, we can dene st as
st 2 f(GL; GC); (BL; GC); (GL; BC); (BL; BC)g:
For instance, (BL; BC) is when the bad state rules in both credit and liquidity
markets which can be interpreted as the nancial crisis state. The transition
probabilities for the four-state Markov-switching process can be expressed
through the 4 4 matrix M :8>><>>:
m11 m12 m13 m14
m21 m22 m23 m24
m31 m32 m33 m34
m41 m42 m43 m44
9>>=>>;
where 
0
4M = 
0
4, with 4 = [1; 1; 1; 1]
0
ensures that probabilities sum to
one. To ensure that G and B represent good and bad states we restrict the
unconditional means of Ct and Lkt to be lower in the good states than in the
bad:
C0 (GC)
1  C1 (GC)
<
C0 (BC)
1  C1 (BC)
L0 (GL)
1  L1 (GL)
<
L0 (BL)
1  L1 (BL)
E[C(GC)] < E[C(BC)]
E[kL(GL)] < E[kL(BL)]
That is, spreads and credit risk are higher and more volatile on average in
the bad states.
Note that the liquidity factors across currencies are linked through this
Markov state, since we assume the same st holds for all currencies. Thus,
it captures the inter-linked nature of liquidity. However, by having di¤erent
coe¢ cients for di¤erent currencies (e.g. Lk1(s
L
t ) and other parameters di¤er
across currencies), we allow for the impacts of di¤erences in monetary policy
implementation and provision of central bank liquidity.
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3 Bayesian Estimation Methods
Bayesian estimation of our model can be done using a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) algorithm which combines familiar algorithms for dynamic
factor and Markov switching models. Accordingly, we do not provide details
here, but provide only a sketch of how the algorithm proceeds. A Technical
Appendix containing full details of our MCMC algorithm is available on
http://personal.strath.ac.uk/gary.koop/. Our model depends on the latent
credit and liquidity risk factors (Lkt and Ct), and the Markov switching states
(sLt and s
C
t ). Conditional on all these latent variables, the model dened by
(1), (2), (3) and (4) is a multivariate Normal linear regression model and
our MCMC algorithm can draw on standard methods to draw the factor
loadings and other parameters of the model. Conditional on draws of these
parameters and draws of sLt and s
C
t , standard methods for drawing factors
can be used to draw Lkt and Ct. We use the algorithm described in Kim and
Nelson (1999, chapter 8).
Conditional on draws of Lkt and Ct and the parameters in (1), (2), (3) and
(4), we use methods for drawing from Markov switching models described in
Kim and Nelson (1999, chapter 9).
Our prior imposes the inequality and equality restrictions on the parame-
ters described in the previous section, but is otherwise relatively noninforma-
tive. Precise details are provided in the Technical Appendix to this paper.
We have carried out an extensive prior sensitivity analysis which shows our
results are robust, even to reasonably large changes in the prior. Results of
this prior sensitivity analysis are also available in the Technical Appendix.
We use the posterior expectation of the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) and Akaikes information criterion (AIC) to compare models.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Data
Our daily data runs from 2 January 2007 to 15 December 2009 for the fol-
lowing 12 banks (acronyms used in tables in parentheses) that listed in the
LIBOR panels for USD, GBP and EUR: Barclays (barclays), Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi UFJ (btmufj), Citibank (citibank), Deutsche Bank (deutschebank),
JPMorgan Chase (jpmc), HBOS (hbos), HSBC (hsbc), Lloyds TSB Bank
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(lloyds), Rabobank (rabobank), Royal Bank of Scotland (rboscotland), UBS
(ubs), and WestLB (westlb). For each bank, we consider three term rates:
one-month, three-month and twelve-month.
With regards to the explanatory variables in (1) and (2), for Zt we use
the implied volatility of overall stock prices (VIX). Djt is a measure of bank-
specic credit risk and inclusion of the VIX controls for volatility in the
market as a whole (e.g. Hakkio and Keeton, 2009). In the equations with the
LIBOR-OIS spreads as dependent variables, we set Xt to be the commonly-
used Term Auction Facility (TAF) dummy variable (which equals one for
auction dates) when the Fed was injecting liquidity into the markets. We
include Xt only in the equations involving the USD.
Both LIBOR-OIS spread and CDS rate are measured in basis points,
while VIX is a percentage. To have all the data of approximately the same
magnitude, we divide both CDS and VIX data by 100 and demean all the
variables. Excluding common holidays and weekends,5 we have 727 observa-
tions for each variable.
4.2 Model Comparison
In addition to the very exible unrestricted model described in Section 2, we
estimate several restricted models which reduce the number of latent liquidity
factors and/or remove the Markov switching part of the model. Altogether,
we estimated eight models:
 Model A (the Full Model): One latent credit risk factor, three latent
liquidity risk factors in USD, GBP and EUR, respectively.
 Model B: One latent credit risk factor, one common latent liquidity
risk factor in USD and GBP, one unique latent liquidity risk factor in
EUR.
 Model C: One latent credit risk factor, one unique latent liquidity risk
factor in USD, one common latent liquidity risk factor in GBP and
EUR.
 Model D: One latent credit risk factor, one common latent liquidity
risk factor in USD, GBP and EUR.
5Four of the banks have a small number of missing observations. We simply omit these
observations for these banks.
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 Model E: Same as Model A but without Markov switching.
 Model F: Same as Model B but without Markov switching.
 Model G: Same as Model C but without Markov switching.
 Model H: Same as Model D but without Markov switching.
Before presenting empirical results relating to nancially-relevant features
of interest, it is important to present statistical information on which models
are supported by the data. Table 1 reports AIC and BIC for these eight
models. The rst point that stands out is that neither of the information
criteria vary by a large amount across models. If we were to do a Bayesian
model averaging exercise using the information criteria to construct model
weights, then all of the models would receive appreciable probability. Sec-
ondly, Models A (the full unrestricted model) and E (which is the same as
Model A except removes the Markov switching component of the model) are
the two models which perform best according to both information criteria.
AIC chooses the Model A as being best whereas the more parsimonious BIC
chooses Model E.
Both Model A and Model E include three liquidity risk factors, one for
each of the currency markets (USD, EUR, GBP). Note that Table 1 indicates
little support for the idea that it is statistically acceptable to reduce the
number of liquidity risk factors. Models with a single liquidity risk factor
perform worst in Table 1. Models with two liquidity risks factors, one for
the USD and the second for the EUR and GBP, do not perform too poorly,
but are clearly out-performed by models with three liquidity risk factors.
Thus, statistically-speaking, we are nding evidence to support our practice
of using information in the three currency markets, as opposed to working
solely with the USD market (as it typically done in the literature).
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Table 1: Model Comparison
BIC AIC
Model A -3.118 -4.217
Model B -2.739 -3.812
Model C -2.901 -3.974
Model D -2.474 -3.527
Model E -3.168 -4.191
Model F -2.815 -3.831
Model G -2.942 -3.959
Model H -2.508 -3.518
4.3 Financial Features of Interest
4.3.1 The Factors
In light of the ndings of the preceding sub-section, in our discussion of
nancial features of interest, we will restrict our attention to the Full Model
(Model A) and the Best Model (Model E) selected by BIC.
There are many nancially-interesting features of interest in our modelling
framework. In addition to the parameters in the model, we can present the
latent factors, Lkt and Ct, which shed light on liquidity and credit risk. For
the Full Model, we can also present the probabilities of our four states (i.e.
f(GL; GC); (BL; GC); (GL; BC); (BL; BC)g) relating to the Markov switching
aspect of the model
Furthermore, to investigate the relative roles of credit and liquidity risks
in the nancial crisis, we also present a variance decomposition based on the
LIBOR-OIS equations. As explained in McAndrews et al (2008), credit and
liquidity risks might be correlated. Additionally, the latent risk factors might
not be orthogonal to Xk. The existence of possibly correlated components
renders variance decomposition a less straightforward exercise. From (1), we
have the following:
var (Sijkt) =
 
Sijk
2
var (Lkt) +
 
 Sij
2
var (Ct) +


0
ik
2
var (Xt) + var
 
"Sijkt

(5)
+2Sijk 
S
ijcov (Lkt; Ct) + 2
S
ijkijcov (Lkt; Xt) + 2 
S
ij
0
ikcov (Ct; Xt) :
Following, e.g., Campbell and Ammer (1993), we report all the components
on the right hand side of equation (5) as a proportion of var (Sijkt). This
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decomposition will allow us to see the the relevant importance of the di¤erent
terms on the right hand side of (1).
The posterior mean of the latent credit and liquidity risks are presented
in Figure 1 (for the Full Model) and Figure 2 (for the Best Model).6 Figure
1 and Figure 2 exhibit almost identical patterns, indicating that the addition
of Markov switching states adds little to our understanding of credit and
liquidity risk. The three liquidity risk factors tend to move together (although
there are some important di¤erences between them which we will note below)
in a manner that is quite di¤erent from the credit risk factor.
First let us consider credit risk. This tended to grow gradually from
August 2007 to a peak in December 2008, before gradually decreasing. By
the end of 2009, credit risk was still at a level higher than in August 2007,
the time when the nancial turmoil rst emerged. However, it is interesting
to note the two clear dips in credit risk before December 2008. The rst
happened in December 2007. This was around the time when many banks
were forced to take additional large write downs. Furthermore, the Feds term
auction facility (TAF) rst opened on December 17, 2007 (although the dip in
Figures 1 and 2 began well before December 17). It seems that immediate
response in the market to these events was that the perceived credit risk
dropped, though this drop only lasted for the month of December 2007 and by
January 2008 credit risk returned to where it had been before the dip began.
The second smaller drop (or a plateau in the gradual increase) in credit risk
happened in the summer of 2008. However, by late summer of 2008, the
gradual increase in credit risk resumed (even before Lehman Brothers nally
went bankrupt in September 2008 and AIG disclosed that it faced serious
liquidity shortage). It worth mentioning that credit risk remained at a high
level throughout 2009, only slightly lower than its December 2008 peak. But
it is worth stressing that the movements in the latent credit risk tend to be
gradual and there is no huge spike in credit risk in autumn 2008.
In contrast to the credit risk, liquidity risks rose and dropped more
abruptly. Figures 1 and 2 show that there were three major upsurges in
liquidity risk, with by far the largest being at the time when the nancial
crisis was at its worst (i.e. in autumn 2008). The other two peaks in liquidity
risk occurs in August 2007 and December 2007. August 2007 is often cited as
the beginning of the nancial crisis when Northern Rocks problems became
clear. Also in August, central banks implemented a wide range of unprece-
6To aid visual inspection, we normalize each risk factor by its own standard deviation.
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dented liquidity easing approaches. For instance, European Central Bank
(ECB) injected 95 billion Euros in overnight credit and the Fed injected $24
billion. Our methodology is nding all liquidity risks to have dropped after
an August 2007 peak, although this drop was much more rapid in the USD
than the EUR market. The second peak, in early to mid-December 2007 is
just before the time that the Feds term auction facility, TAF, began. It rst
opened on December 17, 2007 and our methodology is nding liquidity risk
to have fallen shortly after this.
During all of these upsurges, liquidity risks in the three di¤erent currencies
behaved broadly similarly to one another. However, there are many minor
di¤erences in their behavior (which presumably accounts for why models with
fewer than three liquidity factors performed poorly in Table 1). One notable
di¤erence is that the EUR liquidity risk exhibited a fourth upsurge in May
and June 2008 which does not appear in the USD and GBP liquidity risks.
Furthermore, as noted above, after the August 2007 increase in liquidity risk
(common to all currencies), liquidity risk remained high in the EUR market
well after it declined in the other currencies.
Another interesting di¤erence between currencies can be noted at the
time that the credit crunch was at its worst. In October 2008, when all
the three liquidity risks skyrocketed, liquidity risk in USD led those of the
other currencies (and especially the GBP). Furthermore, the USD liquidity
risk reached a higher level than the EUR liquidity risk. Interestingly, after
reaching the peak, liquidity risks in USD and EUR dropped much more
rapidly than those in the GBP currency market.
As noted above, the comparison between the evolution of credit risk and
the liquidity risks is quite informative. Credit risk tends to move quite slowly,
whereas we have seen liquidity risks swayed up and down more rapidly and
in a manner consistent with the familiar events of the nancial crisis. This
suggests the importance of liquidity risk relative to credit risk in the evolution
of the nancial crisis. We will investigate this point in greater depth below.
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Figure 1
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Figure 2
4.3.2 The Markov Switching States
Table 1 and the similarity of results in Figures 1 and 2 suggest that Markov
switching is not an empirically vital aspect of our model. It seems that al-
lowing for the gradual evolution of factors, as state equations such as (3) and
(4) would allow for (even if we removed the Markov switching state variable),
is adequate to capture the main empirical features of the data. Nevertheless,
our Full Model which includes the Markov switching does receive apprecia-
ble support in Table 1, so it is worthwhile to briey present empirical results
relating to this aspect of the model.
Table 2 presents information about the posterior of the matrix of tran-
sition probabilities. We nd that 90% of the time the model is either in
the (GL; GC) or (BL; BC) state. This accounts for why the probabilities for
remaining in the other states are quite low and imprecisely estimated (as
revealed by large posterior standard deviations). The point estimates imply
that the good credit and good liquidity state is quite persistent (i.e. given
it is currently in this state, the probability of remaining in it is 95%). The
bad liquidity and bad credit state is somewhat less persistent (i.e. the point
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estimate tells us the probability of remaining there is 74%).
Table 2: Posterior Mean of Transition Probabilities
(Posterior standard deviations in parentheses)
(GL; GC) (BL; GC) (GL; BC) (BL; BC)
(GL; GC)
0:945
(0:013)
0:275
(0:152)
0:178
(0:111)
0:102
(0:052)
(BL; GC)
0:014
(0:009)
0:268
(0:151)
0:079
(0:079)
0:095
(0:070)
(GL; BC)
0:016
(0:010)
0:088
(0:086)
0:635
(0:166)
0:066
(0:043)
(BL; BC)
0:025
(0:011)
0:369
(0:182)
0:108
(0:094)
0:736
(0:081)
Figures 3 through 6 plot posterior means of the states themselves for the
four states. Figures 3 and 6 are of most interest since, as just discussed, the
states plotted in Figures 4 and 5 (i.e. (BL; GC) and (GL; BC)) rarely occur
in our data set. Given this fact, Figures 3 and 6 can be seen (approximately)
to be mirror images of each other. Our main ndings are that, at the heart
of the credit crunch (from mid-September through mid-November 2008), the
bad liquidity and bad credit state holds (with a few exceptions). The other
periods when the bad liquidity and credit state often has high probability
are similar to periods discussed previously and associated with the liquidity
risk upsurges noted in Figures 1 and 2. These are late August through mid-
September, 2007 and December 2007.
Thus, Table 2 and Figures 3 through 6 indicate that the major periods
of the credit crisis were associated with increases in both credit and liquidity
risk.
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Figure 3
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Figure 4
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Figure 5
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Figure 6
4.3.3 Variance Decompositions
Our results thus far suggest that both liquidity and credit risk played a role in
the nancial crisis, although perhaps the former played a more important role
than the latter. The variance decomposition of (5) can be used to formalize
these ndings. Noting that this decomposition relates to var (Sijkt), it follows
that we will have a variance decomposition for each bank, term and currency
(i.e. each i; j and k). These are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5 for the Full
Model. Results using the Best Model are similar and will not reported here
for the sake of brevity.
Note rst that results in these tables indicate our model is tting well,
with the error rarely accounting for more than 10% of the variation in spreads
and typically accounting for much less (especially at the 3 month term). Fur-
thermore, there are substantive di¤erences across banks, terms and currencies
which provides us with strong evidence of the need for studies such as the
present one which exploits these panel dimensions in the econometric model.
The pattern in the tables is for liquidity risk to play the predominant role
at short terms (1 month or 3 months). Particularly for one month LIBOR-
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OIS spreads, we have strong evidence that liquidity risk has been the major
driver. For the GBP, the proportion of the variability in one month spreads
attributable to the liquidity risk factor is typically very near to one (e.g.
numbers like 0.99 or 0.98 are common) and never less than 0.80. For the USD
and EUR markets the role of liquidity risk, although still high, is somewhat
lower (e.g. numbers like 0.83 and 0.85 are common).
At the three month term, a similar pattern holds but the role of liquidity
risk is somewhat less than at the one month term. But there are important
di¤erences across currencies. That is, in the USD markets, liquidity risk
typically accounts for 75 or 80% of the variability in spreads. But in the
GBP market these numbers tend to be around 65% and in the EUR markets
even lower than this.
At the 12 month term, however, a di¤erent picture emerges. At this
longer term, credit risk assumes a much more important role. Although
there is some variation across currencies and over banks, we are tending to
nd credit risk to account for about 50% of the variability in spreads in the
USD markets (results for the GBP are slightly lower and EUR slightly higher
than this). Liquidity risk is still important, tending to account for 20 or 30%
of the variability in spreads in the USD markets (with results for the GBP
being slightly higher and EUR slightly lower than this). However, credit risk
is clearly the more important factor at this longer term in the vast majority
of cases.
The role of the covariance between the liquidity and credit risk factors
tends to be fairly small, accounting for typically around 10% of the variability
in spreads. The other covariance terms in the variance decomposition play a
negligible role. The dummy explanatory variable containing the TAF auction
dates also explains little of the variation in spreads.
Note that the main dependent variable in our study is Sijkt, as opposed to
most of the related literature which works with St. The preceding discussion
of the variance decompositions (as well as our earlier empirical results) have
shown that there are substantive di¤erences across currencies and terms, em-
phasizing the importance of having ik subscripts on our dependent variable.
But what about the j subscript? Are there benets from working with a panel
of banks, as we do, rather than just working with an aggregate LIBOR-OIS
spread which averages over banks? With one exception, an examination of
Tables 3 to 5 indicates that, although there is some variation across banks,
it tends to be fairly minor. The one exception is HBOS, results for which
are substantively di¤erent from all the other banks. The role of the credit
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risk factor for HBOS, at all terms and in all currencies, consistently is very
low. Especially at longer horizons they are much lower than the other banks
in the sample.
4.4 Robustness to Modelling Assumptions
In this paper, we have presented results using a very exible model and
compared the full model to several restricted versions of it. We have used
a proper, but relatively noninformative prior and a sensible identication
scheme. We have investigated other modelling assumptions and have found
our results to be very robust. Since these investigations do not substan-
tively alter the empirical conclusions of this paper (and for the sake of
brevity), we do not present these additional empirical results here. In-
stead they are included in the Technical Appendix to this paper available
at http://personal.strath.ac.uk/gary.koop/.
In particular, this appendix contains results from a prior sensitivity analy-
sis and di¤erent identication assumptions. Furthermore, we also estimated
the model using data of the eight banks for which we do not have any miss-
ing observations. These are barclays, citibank, deutschebank, jpmc, lloyds,
rabobank, rboscotland, ubs. The latent risk factors derived from the eight
bank panel are found to be very similar to what we get from the twelve bank
panel.
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Table 3: Proportion of Variance of Spreads Attributable to Each Component (USD)
var(L) var ( C) var(X) cov(L,C) cov(L,X) cov(C,X) var(e)
barclays1m 0.8918 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.1054
barclays3m 0.8208 0.0720 0.0000 0.0966 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0108
barclays12m 0.2720 0.4217 0.0000 0.1345 0.0000 0.0000 0.1718
btmufj1m 0.8755 0.0042 0.0011 0.0239 0.0023 0.0000 0.0930
btmufj3m 0.7801 0.1027 0.0000 0.1125 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0050
btmufj12m 0.2129 0.5345 0.0000 0.1340 0.0000 0.0000 0.1186
citibank1m 0.8963 0.0015 0.0013 0.0146 0.0025 0.0000 0.0836
citibank3m 0.7715 0.1101 0.0000 0.1158 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0029
citibank12m 0.1991 0.5585 0.0000 0.1325 0.0000 0.0000 0.1099
deutschebank1m 0.9094 0.0000 0.0014 0.0002 0.0026 0.0000 0.0864
deutschebank3m 0.7876 0.0982 0.0000 0.1106 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0039
deutschebank12m 0.2908 0.4672 0.0000 0.1465 0.0000 0.0000 0.0956
hbos1m 0.8682 0.0000 0.0009 0.0001 0.0020 0.0000 0.1287
hbos3m 0.8352 0.0038 0.0000 0.0221 -0.0002 0.0000 0.1391
hbos12m 0.6070 0.0496 0.0000 0.0688 0.0000 0.0000 0.2747
hsbc1m 0.9085 0.0001 0.0013 0.0028 0.0025 0.0000 0.0848
hsbc3m 0.7876 0.0992 0.0000 0.1111 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0024
hsbc12m 0.2660 0.4843 0.0000 0.1426 0.0000 0.0000 0.1070
jpmc1m 0.9009 0.0000 0.0015 0.0003 0.0027 0.0000 0.0946
jpmc3m 0.7692 0.1076 0.0000 0.1144 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0091
jpmc12m 0.1849 0.5484 0.0000 0.1265 0.0000 0.0000 0.1403
lloyds1m 0.9186 0.0000 0.0013 0.0005 0.0026 0.0000 0.0770
lloyds3m 0.7716 0.1103 0.0000 0.1160 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0024
lloyds12m 0.1903 0.5624 0.0000 0.1300 0.0000 0.0000 0.1173
rabobank1m 0.8999 0.0006 0.0015 0.0089 0.0027 0.0000 0.0864
rabobank3m 0.7460 0.1237 0.0000 0.1208 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0098
rabobank12m 0.2110 0.5224 0.0000 0.1319 0.0000 0.0000 0.1346
rboscotland1m 0.9163 0.0001 0.0012 0.0036 0.0024 0.0000 0.0764
rboscotland3m 0.7686 0.1099 0.0000 0.1155 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0062
rboscotland12m 0.1867 0.5159 0.0000 0.1233 0.0000 0.0000 0.1741
ubs1m 0.9148 0.0001 0.0012 0.0045 0.0024 0.0000 0.0769
ubs3m 0.7560 0.1217 0.0000 0.1206 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0021
ubs12m 0.1929 0.5353 0.0000 0.1276 0.0000 0.0000 0.1441
westlb1m 0.8708 0.0015 0.0013 0.0145 0.0024 0.0000 0.1095
westlb3m 0.7369 0.1307 0.0000 0.1234 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0093
westlb12m 0.1818 0.5561 0.0000 0.1263 0.0000 0.0000 0.1358
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Table 4: Proportion of Variance of Spreads Attributable to Each Component (GBP)
var(L) var ( C) var(X) cov(L,C) cov(L,X) cov(C,X) var(e)
barclays1m 0.9964 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0036
barclays3m 0.6936 0.1117 0.0000 0.1493 0.0000 0.0000 0.0454
barclays12m 0.3393 0.4224 0.0000 0.2031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0352
btmufj1m 0.9363 0.0081 0.0000 0.0466 0.0000 0.0000 0.0091
btmufj3m 0.6632 0.1297 0.0000 0.1574 0.0000 0.0000 0.0497
btmufj12m 0.4042 0.3832 0.0000 0.2112 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013
citibank1m 0.9627 0.0025 0.0000 0.0263 0.0000 0.0000 0.0084
citibank3m 0.6614 0.1204 0.0000 0.1515 0.0000 0.0000 0.0668
citibank12m 0.3860 0.4004 0.0000 0.2110 0.0000 0.0000 0.0027
deutschebank1m 0.9893 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0103
deutschebank3m 0.6811 0.1194 0.0000 0.1530 0.0000 0.0000 0.0464
deutschebank12m 0.4663 0.3144 0.0000 0.2055 0.0000 0.0000 0.0138
hbos1m 0.8170 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.1828
hbos3m 0.6717 0.0046 0.0000 0.0295 0.0000 0.0000 0.2943
hbos12m 0.5569 0.0366 0.0000 0.0764 0.0000 0.0000 0.3301
hsbc1m 0.9705 0.0001 0.0000 0.0057 0.0000 0.0000 0.0236
hsbc3m 0.6560 0.1306 0.0000 0.1571 0.0000 0.0000 0.0563
hsbc12m 0.4222 0.3599 0.0000 0.2092 0.0000 0.0000 0.0087
jpmc1m 0.9895 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0099
jpmc3m 0.6919 0.1078 0.0000 0.1465 0.0000 0.0000 0.0538
jpmc12m 0.4497 0.3364 0.0000 0.2087 0.0000 0.0000 0.0052
lloyds1m 0.9978 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012
lloyds3m 0.6791 0.1208 0.0000 0.1537 0.0000 0.0000 0.0465
lloyds12m 0.3867 0.4010 0.0000 0.2113 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010
rabobank1m 0.9702 0.0008 0.0000 0.0149 0.0000 0.0000 0.0141
rabobank3m 0.6683 0.1207 0.0000 0.1524 0.0000 0.0000 0.0587
rabobank12m 0.4470 0.3355 0.0000 0.2078 0.0000 0.0000 0.0097
rboscotland1m 0.9907 0.0002 0.0000 0.0067 0.0000 0.0000 0.0024
rboscotland3m 0.6555 0.1367 0.0000 0.1606 0.0000 0.0000 0.0471
rboscotland12m 0.3503 0.4340 0.0000 0.2093 0.0000 0.0000 0.0064
ubs1m 0.9861 0.0003 0.0000 0.0084 0.0000 0.0000 0.0052
ubs3m 0.6411 0.1411 0.0000 0.1614 0.0000 0.0000 0.0564
ubs12m 0.4013 0.3863 0.0000 0.2113 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011
westlb1m 0.9665 0.0025 0.0000 0.0265 0.0000 0.0000 0.0045
westlb3m 0.6500 0.1459 0.0000 0.1653 0.0000 0.0000 0.0388
westlb12m 0.3917 0.3959 0.0000 0.2113 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011
23
Table 5: Proportion of Variance of Spreads Attributable to Each Component (EUR)
var(L) var ( C) var(X) cov(L,C) cov(L,X) cov(C,X) var(e)
barclays1m 0.8953 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1047
barclays3m 0.6521 0.1986 0.0000 0.1391 0.0000 0.0000 0.0101
barclays12m 0.2183 0.5940 0.0000 0.1392 0.0000 0.0000 0.0485
btmufj1m 0.8509 0.0154 0.0000 0.0441 0.0000 0.0000 0.0896
btmufj3m 0.6115 0.2391 0.0000 0.1478 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015
btmufj12m 0.2308 0.5804 0.0000 0.1415 0.0000 0.0000 0.0474
citibank1m 0.8573 0.0045 0.0000 0.0240 0.0000 0.0000 0.1142
citibank3m 0.6327 0.2208 0.0000 0.1445 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020
citibank12m 0.2288 0.5784 0.0000 0.1406 0.0000 0.0000 0.0522
deutschebank1m 0.8600 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.1396
deutschebank3m 0.5914 0.2377 0.0000 0.1449 0.0000 0.0000 0.0260
deutschebank12m 0.2786 0.5370 0.0000 0.1495 0.0000 0.0000 0.0348
hbos1m 0.8276 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.1721
hbos3m 0.7510 0.0077 0.0000 0.0290 0.0000 0.0000 0.2123
hbos12m 0.5575 0.0610 0.0000 0.0711 0.0000 0.0000 0.3104
hsbc1m 0.8616 0.0003 0.0000 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 0.1330
hsbc3m 0.6458 0.2079 0.0000 0.1416 0.0000 0.0000 0.0047
hsbc12m 0.2908 0.5170 0.0000 0.1499 0.0000 0.0000 0.0423
jpmc1m 0.9018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0977
jpmc3m 0.6562 0.2013 0.0000 0.1405 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020
jpmc12m 0.2787 0.5280 0.0000 0.1483 0.0000 0.0000 0.0450
lloyds1m 0.8918 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.1073
lloyds3m 0.6309 0.2220 0.0000 0.1447 0.0000 0.0000 0.0024
lloyds12m 0.2037 0.6015 0.0000 0.1353 0.0000 0.0000 0.0595
rabobank1m 0.8816 0.0015 0.0000 0.0137 0.0000 0.0000 0.1032
rabobank3m 0.6043 0.2301 0.0000 0.1442 0.0000 0.0000 0.0214
rabobank12m 0.2736 0.5323 0.0000 0.1475 0.0000 0.0000 0.0467
rboscotland1m 0.8773 0.0003 0.0000 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000 0.1164
rboscotland3m 0.6107 0.2350 0.0000 0.1465 0.0000 0.0000 0.0078
rboscotland12m 0.1847 0.6213 0.0000 0.1309 0.0000 0.0000 0.0630
ubs1m 0.8353 0.0005 0.0000 0.0078 0.0000 0.0000 0.1564
ubs3m 0.5832 0.2578 0.0000 0.1499 0.0000 0.0000 0.0091
ubs12m 0.2277 0.5860 0.0000 0.1412 0.0000 0.0000 0.0451
westlb1m 0.8539 0.0043 0.0000 0.0234 0.0000 0.0000 0.1184
westlb3m 0.5929 0.2518 0.0000 0.1494 0.0000 0.0000 0.0059
westlb12m 0.2337 0.5835 0.0000 0.1427 0.0000 0.0000 0.0400
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have motivated and developed a statistical model which
uses a panel of LIBOR-OIS spreads and bank CDS rates to disentangle liq-
uidity and credit risk. The panel dimensions of the spreads include variation
across banks, currencies and terms. The existing literature almost always
ignores these panel dimensions and simply works with one average LIBOR-
OIS spread. From a statistical point of view, our empirical results show
that there are benets from exploiting these panel dimensions in terms of
increasing our understanding of liquidity and credit risk.
Our empirical results indicate that liquidity and credit risks both played
an important role in the nancial crisis. However, especially at the 1 month
and 3 month terms, the role of liquidity risks is much more important. At
the 12 month term, credit and liquidity risks both play an important role.
The latent liquidity risk factors are much more variable than the credit risk
factor and their variation is associated with familiar events in the nancial
crisis.
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